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The Past of Communication's
Hoped-For Future
by Klaus Krippendorff, University of Pennsylvania
In this essay I am suggesting that much of communication scholarship to
date has been message driven and that this dominant form of explaining
what communication is or does is slowly being challenged by what one
may call reflexive explanations. This discursive perturbation offers re
searchers the choice of either narrowing their domain of inquiry to where
mt!ssage-driven explanations can be enforced, or embarking on an excit
ing path of reconstructing our field.
Let me begin by stating what I see as three defining features of mes
sage-driven explanations and then consider some of their fruits.
First, messages are objectively describable compositions, texts, or
events. They are created to be moveable from one physical location or
context to another or reprod11cible at different places or times. They thus
exist in an objective reality and indept!ndent of anyone receiving them.
References to intertextuality, message systems, or situational structures
do not substantially alter the subject-independence of this starting point
of message-driven explanations.
Second, messages affect, persuade, inform, stimulate, or arouse those
exposed to them. Whatever messages caust! or bring to their receivers,
their contents, the symbolic qualities they have, are believed carried in
their composition or structure and must therefore be explained or be the
orized as afu11ctio11 of these objective properties. Cognition is simplified
to a linear process of responding to or interpreting given mes.,age-..
Third, expos11re lo the same messages causes commo1wlities among
senders and receivers, and, in the case of the mass media, among audi9
ence members. This gives "communication" its social significance and a
standard for evaluating its success. So, deviations from expected com
monalities become individual failures, misinterpretations, ideological or
cognitive biases, noise, systemic distortions, and so on.
Thus, message-driven explanations are both objeclivisl and implicitly
IIOr/1Ultive.
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The End of Theories We Grew Up With
Message-driven explanations have ancient roots-for example, in the
rhetoricians' search for linguistic forms that make arguments compelling.
Their modern incarnation comes from journalism. Journalists see them
selves as writing newspapers and magazines that were created to be mass
produced and imiformly comprehensible to their readers. When new
media such as radio and TV came along, and when interpersonal encoun
ters, political events, and organizational processes came to be seen as
communication as well, the printed message quickly became the domi
nant metaphor for conceptualizing them. The fact that discrete messages
were not so obviously, if at all, identifiable in these new media; that dif
ferences in interpersonal skills, accessability, and authority had no place
in these explanations; and that definitions of community or of a public
based on common exposure to messages became empirically untenable,
did not prevent communication researchers from refining message-driven
explanations.
In fact, Lasswell (1948) codified the field, its research questions and ex
planations, by defining communication research as providing answers to
the five questions: "Who, says what, in which channel, to whom, and
with what effects." To date, his formula defines many communication re
search designs. In the same year, Berelson and Lazarsfeld 0948) finished
their conception of content analysis as an uobjective, systematic, and
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,"
.
promising scientific accounts of what messages carry to everyone with ac
cess to them. Also in 1948, Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) first pub
lished A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Many communication
rese.irchers immediately embraced his terminology, probably for the sci
entific legitimacy a mathematically founded concept accorded to inquiries
into communication, including the mass media (Schramm, 1954, 1955).
However, only Shannon's diagram and Weaver's popular commentary on
the theory entered the bulk of communications literature. Although the
theory extended our vocabulary-adding such terms as redundancy and
the encoding and decoding of messages-Shannon's statistical and rela
tivist measure of information quickly became equated with news, or the
stuff that messages "objectively" contain. After these basic notions were
in place, message-driven explanations mushroomed. Without reviewing
the many and more increasingly sophisticated versions of message-driven
explanations that developed from these early beginnings, let me simply
suggest that they now permeate the examplars in our field: studies corre
lating message variables and effects, inquiries into the effectiveness of
different message designs, use of mathematical theories to predict atti
tude changes from media exposure, and so forth. None of these regard
the human participants in the progress as capable of making up their own
meanings, negotiating relationships among themselves, and reflecting on
their own realitit!s.
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The Past of Communication's
Hoped-For Future
by Klaus Krippendorff, University of Pennsylvania
In this essay I am suggesting that much of communication scholarship to
date has been message driven and chat this dominant form of explaining
what communication is or doe<; is slowly being challenged by what one
may call reflexive explanations. This discursive perturbation offers re
searchers the choice of either narrowing their domain of inquiry to where
message-driven explanations can be enforced, or embarking on an excit
ing path of reconstructing our field.
Let me begin by stating what I see as three defining features of mes
sage-driven explanations and then consider some of their fruits.
First, messages arc objectively describable compositions, texts, or
events. They are created to be moveable from one physical location or
context to another or reproducible at different places or times. They thus
exist in an objective reality and independent of anyone receiving them.
References to intertextuality, message systems, or situational structures
do not substantially alter the subject-independence of this starting point
of message-driven explanations.
Second, messages affect, persuade, inform, stimulate, or arouse those
exposed to them. Whatever messages cause or bring to their receivers,
their contents, the symbolic qualities they have, are believed carried in
their composition or structure and mw,t therefore be explained or be the
orized as afu11ctio11 of these objective properties. Cognition is simplified
to a linear process of responding to or interpreting given messages.
Third, exposure to the same messages causes commo,wlilies among
senders and receivers, and, in the case of the mass media, among audi
ence members. This gives "communication" its social significance and a
standard for evaluating its success. So, deviations from expected com
monalities become individual failures, misinterpretations, ideological or
cognitive biases, noise, systemic distortions, and so on.
Thus, message-driven explanations are both objectivist and implicitly
normative.
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The End of Theories We Grew Up With
Message-driven explanations have ancient roots-for example, in the
_
rhetoricians' search for linguistic forms that make arguments compelling.
Their modern incarnation comes from journalism. Journalists see them
selves as writing newspapers and magazines that were created to be mass
produced and uniformly comprehensible to their readers. When new
media such as radio and TV came along, and when interpersonal encoun
ters, political events, and organizational processes came to be seen as
communication as well, the printed message quickly became the domi
nant metaphor for conceptualizing them. The fact that discrete messages
were not so obviously, if at all, identifiable in these new media; that dif
ferences in interpenmnal skills, accessability, and authority had no place
in these explanations; and that definitions of community or of a public
based on common exposure to messages became empirically untenable,
did not prevent communication researchers from refining message-driven
explanations.
In fact, Lasswell (1948) codified the field, its research questions and ex
planations, by defining communication research as providing answers to
the five questions: "Who, says what, in which channel, to whom, and
with what effects." To date, his formula defines many communication re
search designs. In the same year, Berelson and Lazarsfeld 0948) finished
their conception of content analysis as an "objective, systematic, and
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,"
.
promising scientific accounts of what messages carry to everyone with ac
cess to them. Also in 1948, Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) first pub
lished A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Many communication
researchers immediately embraced his terminology, probably for the sci
entific legitimacy a mathematically founded concept accorded to inquiries
into communication, including the mass media (Schramm, 1954, 1955).
However, only Shannon's diagram and Weaver's popular commentary on
the theory entered the bulk of communications literature. Although the
theory extended our vocabulary-adding such terms as redundancy and
the encoding and decoding of messages-Shannon's statistical and rela
tivist measure of information quickly became equated with news, or the
stuff that messages "objectively" contain. After these basic notions were
in place, message-driven explanations mushroomed. Without reviewing
the many and more increasingly sophisticated versions of message-driven
explanations that developed from these early beginnings, let me simply
suggest that they now permeate the examplars in our field: studies corre
lating message variables and effects, inquiries into the effectiveness of
different message designs, use of mathematical theories to predict atti
tude changes from media exposure, and so forth. None of these regard
the human participants in the progress as capable of making up their own
meanings, negotiating relationships among themselves, and renecting on
their own realities.
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Where message-driven conceptions of communication entered serious
empirical tests, they turned out to be of limited explanatory value. For ex
ample, Katz and Lazarsfeld 0955) found evidence that led them to re
place the hypodermic needle conception of mass media effects with a
two-stepflow model. The first step involved exposure to the media and
the second an informal opinion-creating process mediated by opinion
leaders. Klapper's (1960) massive review of the effects literature conclud
ed that the mass media had rather limited abilities to shape their audience
members' lives. I-Iis conclusions were criticized because (a) his review
was sponsored by the networks who, being under public scrutiny, had an
interest in its outcome; and (b) industry would not continue to finance
the mass media through its advertising without reasonable expectations
of a return on its investment. A more likely explanation for Klapper's
findings is that message-driven conceptions just don't work. Obviously,
the effects researchers, their reviewer Klapper, and his critics' responses
to the mass media and to each other could hardly be explained in causal
terms.
Faced with these apparent failures, scholars came up with new concep
tions. In the beginning these conceptions appeared to be mere stopgap
measures, designed to keep linear causal explanations in place. But they
also provided the seeds for alternatives to the dominant accounting prac
tices. Let me mention some of these.
One is the uses mu/ gratificaliolls approach. This approach can be
traced to propagand.t effects studies during World War II and to Berel
son's (1949) study of what missing the newspaper meant during a strike
in New York City. Inquiries into the social and psychological needs,
sources of expectations, and gratifications derived from mass media at
tendance led proponents Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1974) to turn the
message determinism the other way. How audience members used these
messages was found to be far from uniformly distributed among audience
members. There was no obvious message determinism of effects.
Another and far further going approach can be seen in the informa
tion-seeking paradigm (e.g., Donohew & Tipton, 1973). Here, "objective"
contents of messages are largely irrelevant. Individuals are seen as active
ly engaged in diverse information seeking, avoiding, and processing
strategies, which turn out to be explainable in terms of their "image of re
ality," their "goals, beliefs, and knowledge." Information no longer is ex
plainable from the properties of message alone. Senders or producers no
longer play the central role that message-driven explanations assigned to
them.
In organizational communication research, a so-called i11terprelive "P
proc�cb (e.g., Putnam & Pacanowski, 1983) has become increasingly ap
pealing. It centers on the way individuals make sense of their world
through communicative behaviors, and it attempts to explain choices in
terms of prevailing "organizational cultures" or working climates to which
members of an organization come to be committed. It holds that mea11-
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ings are created mu/ negotiated, neither objectively given nor assignable
by a scientific authority. Individual participation in a social network of in
teraction, not the messages, become the explanatory basis of outcomes
and effects.
Probably the most productive demonstration of the not so minimal ef
fects of mass communication is the reo;earch on the media's ability to cre
ate issues and set agendas for public opinion and action (e.g., Mccombs
& Shaw, 1972). Clearly, issues, agendas, and controversies exist neither
outside language nor without political actors' understanding. They are
part of the very public discourse within which mass media institutions
and mass media audiences constitute themselves. Their reality resides i11
tbe playing of a public game of, albeit unequal, participation. One aspect
of this unequal participation has been theorized as the so-called "spiral of
silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), which adds to the setting of agendas
participants' perception of each others' opinions on issues; it attempts to
predict the emergence of certain political realities by processes analogous
to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Sources of Breakdown and Alternatives
Actually, communication research is comparatively late in experiencing
such breakdowns of message-driven explanations which, while still ram
pant in public and everyday discourses, have been dismissed in other dis
ciplines for different reasons.
The breakdown of the popular notion of language as descriptive or
representative of an objective world external to us and separate from lan
guage has been slow in coming, but it now enters the study of communi
cation at numerous not so obvious entry points. It started with the
Wittgensteinian notion of language as a game people play, -was paralleled
in the Whorfian hypothesis of li11guislic relativity, and has recently led to
the search for more adequate accounts of meaning in terms of the cogui
live scbemas underlying the understanding of linguistic constructions
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Here, the objectivism in message-driven
explanations is quite explicitly and thoroughly discredited and replaced
by an experientialist alternative.
Social constr11clivists have shown that "facts�-from emotions to per
sons, gender, language, and cultural institutions-are socially construct
ed, in the sense of having been invented, perhaps a! a time no longer ac
cessible to individual memories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or from
behind the facade of political institutions (Edelman, 1977), now being ha
bitually reproduced by its participants. Constructivists can be divided into
three camps. The first maintains the belief in an observer-independent re
ality relative to which constructions by the media and by ordinary people
could be compared and verified. In the opinion research literature, Lipp
man was an early proponent of this view. Boorstin 0964) still believes he
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Where message-driven conceptions of communication entered serious
empirical tests, they turned out to be of limited explanatory value. For ex
ample, Katz and Lazarsfeld 0955) found evidence that led them to re
place the hypodermic needle conception of mass media effects with a
lwo-stepjlow model. The first step involved exposure to the media and
the second an informal opinion-creating process mediated by opinion
leaders. Klapper's 0960) massive review of the effects literature conclud
ed that the mass media had rather limited abilities to shape their audience
members' lives. His conclusions were criticized because (a) his review
was sponsored by the networks who, being under public scrutiny, had an
interest in its outcome; and (b) industry would not continue to finance
the mass media through its advertising without reasonable expectations
of a return on its investment. A more likely explanation for Klapper's
findings is that message-driven conceptions just don't work. Obviously,
the effects researchers, their reviewer Klapper, and his critics' responses
to the mass media and to each other could hardly be explained in causal
terms.
Faced with these apparent failures, scholars came up with new concep
tions. In the beginning these conceptions appeared to be mere stopgap
measures, designed to keep linear causal explanations in place. But they
also provided the seeds for alternatives to the dominant accounting prac
tices. Let me mention some of these.
One is the uses mul gratificalions approach. This approach can be
traced to propaganda effects studies during World War II and to Berel
son's 0949) study of what missing the newspaper meant during a strike
in New York City. Inquiries into the social and psychological needs,
sources of expectations, and gratifications derived from mass media at
tendance led proponents Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 0974) to turn the
message determinism the other way. How audience members used these
messages was found to be far from uniformly distributed among audience
members. There was no obvious message determinism of effects.
Another and far further going approach can be seen in the infornw
lion-seeking pc1radigm (e.g., Donohew & Tipton, 1973). Here, "objective"
contents of messages are largely irrelevant. Individuals are seen as active
ly engaged in diverse information seeking, avoiding, and processing
strategies, which turn out to be explainable in terms of their "image of re
ality," their "goals, beliefs, and knowledge." Information no longer is ex
plainable from the properties of message alone. Senders or producers no
longer play the central role that message-driven explanations assigned to
them.
In organizational communication research, a so-called interpretive ap
proach (e.g., Putnam & Pacanowski, 1983) has become increasingly ap
pealing. It centers on the way individuals make sense of their world
through communicative behaviors, and it attempts to explain choices in
terms of prevailing "organizational cultures" or working climates to which
members of an organization come to be committed. It holds that mean-
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ings are created and negotiated, neither objectively given nor assignable
by a scientific authority. Individual participation in a social network of in
teraction, not the messages, become the explanatory basis of outcomes
and effects.
Probably the most productive demonstration of the not so minimal ef
fects of mass communication is the research on the media's ability to cre
ate issues and set agendas for public opinion and action (e.g., McCombs
& Shaw, 1972). Clearly, issues, agendas, and controversies exist neither
outside language nor without political actors' understanding. They are
part of the very public discourse within which mass media institutions
and mass media audiences constitute themselves. Their reality resides in
the playing of a public game of, albeit unequal, participation. One aspect
of this unequal participation has been theorized as the so-called "spiral of
silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), which adds to the setting of agendas
participants' perception of each others' opinions on issues; it attempts to
predict the emergence of certain political realities by processes analogous
to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Sources of Breakdown and Alternatives

Actually, communication research is comparatively late in experiencing
such breakdowns of message-driven explanations which, while still ram
pant in public and everyday discourses, have been dismissed in other dis
ciplines for different reasons.
The breakdown of the popular notion of language as descriptive or
representative of an objective world external to us and separate from lan
guage has been slow in coming, but it now enters the study of communi
cation at numerous not so obvious entry points. It started with the
Wittgensteinian notion of language as a game people play, was paralleled
in the Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity, and has recently led to
the search for more adequace accounts of meaning in terms of the coglli
live schemas underlying the understanding of linguistic constructions
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Here, the objectivism in message-driven
explanations is quite explicitly and thoroughly discredited and replaced
by an experientialist alternative.
Social constructivists have shown that Mfacts''-from emotions to per
sons, gender, language, and cul!ural institutions-are socially construct
ed, in the sense of having been invented, perhap'i at a time no longer ac
cessible to individual memories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or from
behind the facade of political institutions (Edelman, 1977), now being ha
bitually reproduced by its participants. Constructivi'its can be divided into
three camps. The first maintains the belief in an observer-independent re
ality relative to which constructions by the media and by ordinary people
could be compared and verified. In the opinion research literature, Lipp
man was an early proponent of this view. Boorstin O 964) still believes he
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can distinguish pseudo-events from real ones. Tuchman 0974) considers
news as constructed by the way the mass media are organized, and Gitlin
0979) demonstrates how hegemonic processes account for TV entertain
ment. Efforts to deconstruct social phenomena by showing how real so
cial institutions, hegemonic forces, and power structures are responsible
for them belong here as well. This approach-some call it trivial co11stmctivism-is unable to take institutions, structures of domination, ide
ologies, and so forth, including the reality referred to in explaining these
phenomena, as the analysts' constructions.
The second group, the social co11struclio11ists, tie themselves to the
later Wittgenstein and subsequent natural language philosophers by argu
ing that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to language.
Foucault (e.g., 1989) exemplifies a grand semiotic version of this view.
Gergen (1985), his collaborators, and several discourse analysts-few of
which build on Foucault's work-have shown how persons, emotions,
gender, (self-)identity, taboos, and so forth are constructed and negotiat
ed in language. They see no need co refer to facts outside of language.
From their perspective, th<.! mass media do not merely construct a public
reality, they also construct themselves into it.
Finally, radical co11struclivists (Glasersfeld, 1991; Watzlawick, 1984),
joining hands with second-ordl!r cyberneticians (Foerster, 1974; Mead,
1968) and with biological cognitivists (Maturana & Varela, 1987), go be
yond language determinism by insisting that internal and external reality
is omnipresent but 1101 l.mowable without constructive participation by its
observers. This seriously challenges the claim of privileged access to real
ity as a basis of scientific authority, questions the use of this metaphysics
by scientists to justify their role as intellectually superior observers of less
sophisticated others, and criticizes the failure of researchers to reflect on
their own cognitive participation in the phenomena they claim to de
scribe. It radically doubts anyone's ability to provide objective accounts
of the meanings messages have for others and thereby removes the
ground of message-driven explanations. Radiql constructivists also em
brace an important demand of feminist theory (e.g., 13elenky, Clinchy,
Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) to treat knou 1ledge not as abstract and freely
transmittable, but as embodied in a kuowerwho supplies his or her own
terms for understanding, embracing both intellectual and emotional expe
riences. This me:ms that no knowledge can exist outside knowers and
that all facts have their factors, their mak<.!rs. This constructivism is radical
because its conceptual framework grants no epistemological exceptions to
scientific observers, constructivists included.
Let me offer just one example of the kind of message-driven research
whose unreflected claims I find increasingly offensive. Recently, I attend
ed a workshop on the effects of tel<.!vision on children. A good part of it
was devoted to childre11 ·s 1111derstandi11g. Proceeding from commitments
to message-driven explanations, the researcher exposed children to se
lected TV images and tested for what they could recall and correctly iden-
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tify. The findings of these experiml!nts were graphed and presented as
showing how children's understanding improvl!d with age. A construc
tivist critic might ask how and whose understanding is being articulated
here: Clearly, the commitment to me�sage-driven explanations was the
researcher's, not the children's. What counted as messages (what the TV
images depicted) was decided by the reseurcher, not by the children. And
although children live, at least in my exp<.!rience, in a very imaginative,
fantastically rich, und certainly more varied world than adults do, the re
searcher allowed as data only what he could cast into the categories of
his own operationalized understanding. The children's did not matter.
The researcher observed no more than how well children's (unobserved)
understanding conformed to his well articulated expectations of what
children should see or do if they were more like him and less like the
children they were. I le acted as the self-appointed agent of an objective,
shared, and adult world in which and to which children are expected to
adjust, and explored no more than his own preco11ceptio11s, using chil
drl!n, much as they are used in society-as convenient props. Message
driven studies obviously disrespect otbers' tmderstanding. The claim to
have studied children's understanding is not sustainable in the face of the
apparent intellectual imperialism.
One alternative to the above is the anthropologist Wagner's (1981) con
ception of culture. [n the minds of objectivist!-i, culture usually ends up
being a causal agent of overwhelming power. For Wagner it becomes the
anthropologists' way of explaining their encounters wi_th people other
than their own. Respecting, yet not grasping, the emergence of otherness
in conversation, feeling the loss of certainties that everyday communica
tion does afford, experiencing breakdown in the taken-for-grantedness of
common sense, leads the analyst to invent and the interlocutors to co
construct something both can live with. For reflexive anthropologists, this
entails reinventing tbeir own c11/ture. Applied to the research example,
Wagner might suggest listening to the children's stories with wonder and
trying co make sense of why they tell us, if they do, what they see in
terms of our understanding of their understanding of us. [n such a reflex
ive loop, we might learn at le:.p;t to appreciate children's ways of seeing.
We might also come to understand something about our own understand
ing of, for instance, how constrained we have allowed ourselves to be
come.
[n the abovt:, r sec a new convergence of natural language philosophy,
ethnography and cognitivism in linguistics, social and radical construc
tivism, second-order cybernetics, reflexive sociology, and the above men�
tioned responses to the failures of message-driven explanations (not just
in mass communication), to which one might add efforts to understand
the new interactive media (computer interfaces, hyper-media, virtual real
ity) that have so far defied traditional theorizing. The epistemology of this
new constructivism calls into question whether we could have communi
cated the way we said we did.

•17

Defi11i11g Medill Studies

'/1Jt' Pt1s/ of Co1111111111iw/i1111 '.� J-Jr,pl!d-For Fut11re

can distinguish pseudo-events from real ones. Tuchman 0974) considers
news as constructed by the way the mass media are organized, and Gitlin
0979) demonstrates how hegemonic processes account for TV entertain
ment. Efforts to deconstruct social phenomena by showing how real so
cial institutions, hegemonic forces, and power structure� are responsible
for them belong here as well. This approach-some call it trivial con
structivism-is unable to take institutions, structures of domination, ide
ologies, and so forth, including the reality referred to in explaining these
phenomena, as the analysts' constructions.
The second group, the social constructionists, tie themselves to the
later Wittgenstein and subsequent natural language philosophers by argu
ing that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to language.
Foucault (e.g., 1989) exemplifies a grand semiotic version of this view.
Gergen (198;), his collaborators, and several discourse analysts-few of
which build on Foucault's work-have shown how persons, emotions,
gender, (self-)identity, taboos, and so forth are constructed and negotiat
ed in language. They see no need to refer to facts outside of language.
From their perspective, the mass media do not merely construct a public
reality, they also construct themselves into it.
Finally, radical constructivists (Glasersfeld, 1991; Watzlawick, 1984),
joining hands with second-order cybcrneticians (Foerster, 1974; Mead,
1968) and with biological cognitivists (Maturana & Varela, 1987), go be
yond language determinism by insisting that internal and external reality
is omnipresent but not k11owahle wit bout constructive participatio11 by its
observers. This seriously challenges the claim of privileged access to real
ity as a basis of scientific authority, questions the use of this metaphysics
by scientists to justify their role as intellectually superior observers of less
sophisticated others, and criticizes the failure of researchers to reflect on
their own cognitive participation in the phenomena they claim to de
scribe. It radically doubts anyone's ability to provide objective accounts
of the meanings messages have for others and thereby removes the
ground of message-driven explanations. Radiql constructivists also em
brace an important demand of feminist theory (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy,
Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) to treat knowledge not as abstract and freely
transmittable, but as embodied in a knower who supplies his or her own
terms for understanding, embracing both intellectual and emotional expe
riences. This means that no knowledge can exist outside knowers and
that all facts have their factors, their makers. This constructivism is radical
because its conceptual framework grants 110 epistemological exceptions to
scientific observers, constructivists included.
Let me offer just one example of the kind of message-driven research
whose unreflected claims I find increasingly offensive. Recently, I attend
ed a workshop on the effects of television on children. A good part of it
was devoted to cbildren 's 1111derstmuli11g. Proceeding from commitments
to message-driven explanations, the researcher exposed children to se
lected TV images and tested for what they could recall and correctly iden-

tify. The findings of these experiments were graphed and presented as
showing how children's understanding improved with age. A construc
tivist critic might ask how and whose understanding is being articulated
here: Clearly, the commitment to me�sage-driven explanations was the
researcher's, not the children's. What counted as messages (what the TV
images depicted) was decided by the researcher, not by the children. And
although children live, at least in my experience, in a very imaginative,
fantastically rich, and certainly more varied world than adults do, the re
searcher allowed as data only what he could cast into the categories of
his own operationalized understanding. The children's did not matter.
The researcher observed no more than how well children's (unobserved)
understanding conformed to his well articulated expectations of what
children should sec or do if they were more like him and less like the
children they were. He acted as the self-appointed agent of an objective,
shared, and adult world in which and to which children are expected to
adjust, and explored no more than his own preco11ceptio11s, using chil
dren, much as they are used in society-as convenient props. Message
driven studies obviously disrespect others' understanding. The claim to
have studied children's understanding is not sustainable in the face of the
apparent intellectual imperialism.
One alternative to the above is the anthropologist Wagner's 0981) con
ception of culture. In the minds of objectivists, culture usually ends up
being a causal agent of overwhelming power. For Wagner it becomes the
anthropologists' way of explaining their encounters wiJh people other
than their own. Respecting, yet not grasping, the emergence of otherness
in conversation, feeling the loss of certainties that everyday communica
tion does afford, experiencing breakdown in the taken-for-grantedness of
common sense, leads the analyst to invent and the interlocutors to co
construct something both can live with. For reflexive anthropologists, this
entails reinve11ti11g tbeir own culture. Applied to the research example,
Wagner might suggest listening to the children's stories with wonder and
trying to make sense of why they tell us, if they do, what they see in
terms of our understanding of their understanding of us. In such a reflex
ive loop, we might learn at le�st to appreciate children's ways of seeing.
We might also come to understand something about our own understand
ing of, for instance, how constrained we have allowed ourselves to be
come.
In the above, I see a new convergence of natural language philosophy,
ethnography and cognitivism in linguistics, social and radical construc
tivism, second-order cybernetics, reflexive sociology, and the above men
tioned responses to the failures of message-driven explanations (not just
in mass communication), to which one might add efforts to understand
the new interactive media (computer interfaces, hyper-media, virtual real
ity) that have so far defied traditional theorizing. The epistemology of this
new constructivism calls into question whether we could have communi
cated the way we said we did.
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Consider the rather sketchy history of communication research, its fail
ings and the emergence of alternative paths, that I constructed as a st01y.
It began with familiar but simple-minded accounts of how messages drive
humans into compliance. But in its unfolding it is obvious that this simple
beginning contradicts tbe ve,y experience of constructing, commzmicat
ing, and listening to (or reading) it. Here, our story confronts its own re
ality, which resides in its present telling. It suggests that the reality we
sought to approximate by our scientific accounts always was ofour own
making, and it now calls on us to bring into focus the very communica
tion practices we use in inquiring and writing about communication.
To me, this realization marks a bifurcation point for communication re
search. I don't anticipate that message-driven communication research
will disappear. People in positions of authority are all too eager to em
brace deterministic reality constructions that can offer them the prospect
of forcing predictability and controllability onto others. Witness the use of
message-driven vocabulary in the mass media, politics, education, adver
tising, public relations, and management. Communication researchers can
withdraw into this comfortable niche where message-driven explanations
are enforced and the handmaidens of manipulatory interests are reward
ed. This would surely be the end of our story.
Becoming aware of the reality in telling our story of communication is a
way of getting out of the trap of message-driven explanations. But it also
means accepting the notion that reality is a social invention. Surely, we
could not otherwise explain the experience that Reality Jsn 'I Wbat It Used
to Be (Anderson, 1990) and how our constructions of communication
could be evolving, as they do, in the very process of inquiring and com
municating about them. The revolution that this new understanding of re
ality can set in motion could be of a Copernican magnitude. However,
while Copernicus's theory challenged only the location of the center of
the then known astronomical universe and left the hierarchical organiza
tion of social and religious life and the objectivist construction of the uni
verse pretty much intact, the epistemology of this new constructivism
challenges the privileged role of disembodied knowledge and reveals its
complicity in the emergence of hierarchical forms of social and political
authority and its attendant requirement of submission.
Constructability of and in a Virtuous Future
I am suggesting that the strands of scholarship mentioned above could be
woven into a radically new and virtuous syntbesis, seeing humans first �1s
cognitively autonomous beings; second, as reflexive practitioners of com
munication with others (and this includes social scientists in the process
of their inquiries); and third, as morally responsible interveners in, if not
creacors of, the very social realities in which they end up living. To em
brace this new epistemology, let me end this essay by suggesting that
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communication scholars recognize the social constructibility of reality,
with all of its consequences, and make commitments on each of these
three points.
First, the commitment to respect th� cognitive awouomyof those ob
served and theorized. This presupposes the recognition that language,
communication, indeed all social pbenomena exist only in the knowledge
their participants have of them. Specifically, there can be no scientific or
everyday understanding of human communication without an under
standing of the understanding of those involved in communication. Story
tellers can attest to this. Scientists know it when writing for their peers. I
am merely suggesting that we grant those we seek to theorize like abili
ties of understanding. In contrast, message-driven explanations equate
scientiscs' understanding with objective truth and therefore cannot re
spect others' understanding of communication, unless they all agree. Nor
can they acknowledge that anyone's understanding of communication is
reflexively embedded in communicating about it. Cognitive autonomy re
sides in the (my) fact chat (a) individuals cannot be forced or caused to
understand something as intended, as it exists, or as it should be; (b) that
nobody can directly observe someone else's underscanding; (c) that all in
dividual accions are dedicated to preserve individual understanding, and
Cd) that understanding is never final, even in the absence of external stim
ulation.
Respecting this autonomy prevents abstract and disembodied commu
nication tbeory constructions and encourages explanations of communi
cation phenomena (and of other social constructions) from the bottom
up, from the knowledge and practices embodied in its participants. This
contrasts with top-down explanations that attribute determining forces to
someone else's (usually the observing scientists') super-individual con
structions-for example, ideologies, hegemonic forces, cultural deter
minisms, rules, or objective meanings. Respecting this autonomy also
means abandoning tbe idea of creating general tbeories witbout obtain
ing, as far as possible, tbe consent of tbose tbeorized. If people do hold
different theories of communication and practice them with each other, a
general theory of communication may not do justice to either. Indeed,
there are plenty of eminently practical folk theories people live by-for
instance, communication as imparting knowledge, as maintaining or cre
ating relationships, as domination or control, as healing wounds, as
dance, and so forth. For inquiries in communication, I prefer a conversa
tion metaphor because it respects the cognitive autonomy of others (Krip
pendorff, in press, a).
Second, communication scholars should commit themselves to reflexive
tbeory1 constructio11s by means of which they can enter others' under
standing into their own understanding. As understanding is never fin
ished, this means that a reflexive reality cannot remain fixed either. It is
continually created, tried out and tested each time it is being talked
about. This is so for social scientists, whose analytical categories, origi19
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tion metaphor because it respects the cognitive autonomy of others (Krip
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nally invented for mere analytical purposes, can become real (Giddens,
1991, pp. 40-41); for politicians, whose campaign promises can change
political practices; for engineers, whose inventions keep technology on
the move; and so it is in the everyday life of communication. All social
theories must also be communicable, at least among scientific peers, and
may reach and affect those theorized therein. Neither can they escape the
self-reference this entails, nor can their stability be assured in being com
municated. Denying the reflexive nature of human communication (theo
ry) sets communication researchers apart from their subjects and creates
reality constructions that aid technologies and can support oppressive so
cial structures. Reflexivity is perhaps the most outstanding feature of
human communication. I have proposed (Krippendorff, in press, b) that
human communication scholarship redefine itself in terms of the dis
course that embraces itself.
Third, we need a commitment to what one might call a distributive
ethics for social inquiry. In the preceding, I claimed that knowledge, es
pecially social scientific knowledge-communication theory, for exam
ple-can hardly be prevented from entering the phenomena it addresses.
Whether it is intended to be critical or merely descriptive, it can delegit
imize what exists or contribute new social constructions. The changes
thus brought forth encourage the emergence of radically distributed reali
ties, a multiverse of reflexive constructions, that no general theory can
capture. I believe that the increased awareness of our role in the socially
(and hence communicationally) constructed, distributed, and emerging
nature of contemporary realities has brought us, as social scientists, to a
point where truth is secondary to the responsibilities we bear for our con
structions. To be consistent with this new multiverse means to distribute
this responsibility. I made the methodological proposal to invite those af
fected to participate in the construction of communication theories con
cerning them (Krippendorff, in press, a). Living such an ethics may not be
easy. However, practical difficulties should not deter us from developing
methodologies that assure respect for those theorized.
No story of our message-driven past can tell us what the future has in
store. But its present telling demonstrates the constructed nature of our
field, and the awareness of this demonstration affirms our role in invent
ing and reconstructing the social realities we work in. If this is so, we
might as well take the poetic licence to construct, and put into a story, the
most desirable realities we can imagine. Understanding this understand
ing could be a moment of liberation.
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Verbing Communication: Mandate for
Disciplinary Inven�ion
by Brenda Dervin, Ohio State University
Most of the polarities that divide our field-universalist vs. contextual
theories, administrative vs. critical research, qualitative vs. quantitative
approaches, the micro vs. the macro, the theoretic vs. the applied, femi
nist vs. nonfeminist-are symptoms, not the disease. They are shallow in
dicators of something more fundamental. Because that which is funda
mental eludes us, we see both tolerance (a comfortable acceptance of
theoretical pluralism) and dissent (ideological and methodological con
tests) everywhere. It is as if we �ire all studying a very large elephant.
Without addressing the question directly, we seem to assume that we are
studying the same elephant, while comfortably relegating ourselves to
our own parts. But every once in a while we bump into each other.
Our contradictions are used both as a measure of our tolerance (after
all, she does xwhile I do y) and a measure of our dissent (but she is
doing x the wrong way, or her work has these negative consequences).
While caught in these ricochets between tolerance and dissent, we can
pontificate on why media effects remain a black box or why our research
seems irrelevant to practice or why disciplinary status eludes us. It's be
cause "they• use the wrong methodology, wrong theoretic perspective,
wrong ideology, wrong ... They should become more like "us." What we
have is dissent mythologized as tolerance.
At root here is the issue of difference-both the differences. between
different sectors of our field and the differences that are at the heart of
what we study-the differences that characterize human beings, their
symbolic lives, and their symbolic products. I would propose that it is
how we treat the latter differences that confounds our own differences.
Our field and the social sciences in general have for the most part han
died difference in ways that are not fundamental. Because of this, our
theories are weak and we end up attending with much energy to artificial,
symptomatic differences, squabbling over turf and status. We end up try9
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